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OR NEARLY AS LONG AS HUMANS HAVE ENGAGED in organized
violence, there have been attempts to fashion normative architectures
to constrain and limit it. Such architectures-labeled the law of armed conflict
in late, twentieth, century parlance-are the product of a symbiotic
relationship between law and war. At times, man, fearful that warfare is
evolving in a negative direction, acts proactively through law to forestall
possible deleterious consequences. Thus, for example, many States, including
the United States, have agreed to ban the use of blinding lasers in advance of
any military force fielding them.1 Much more frequently, however, law has
proven reactive. 2 Indeed, in the twentieth century, codification efforts have
followed major wars in almost lock,step fashion.3
As the global community enters the next millennium, it is a propitious
moment to consider how this symbiosis between war and the law of armed
conflict will continue to evolve. That is the purpose of this essay. It begins by
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asking what warfare might look like in the
century. This prognosis
provides the foundation on which to offer suggestions as to how law might
respond to future war.
Two obstacles stand in the way of any predictive endeavor along these lines.
First, it quickly becomes apparent that there are myriad reasonable alternative
futures, for the universe of variables is vast. Who are likely to be the core
adversaries of the next century? How technologically advanced will these
notional opponents be, and what might they target? What types of conflict will
dominate the future? Will States generally fight alone, or cooperatively under a
umbrella organizations such as the UN, NATO, WEU, or even the European
Union? How will economic, political, ethical, and social forces affect weapons
development and acquisition?
The second obstacle is more basic. Even assuming arguendo that a "best"
guess can be discerned among potential futures, history, as Arthur Schlesinger
has noted, "teaches us that the future is full of surprises and outwits all our
certitude.,,4 Who, for example, watching the Wright brothers' Flyer in 1903
would have predicted that air power would dominate
warfare or that reconnaissance would be conducted from
objects
circling the earth?s
Despite the fog obscuring the future, the search for its correct trajectory is a
necessary exercise in our efforts to affect it positively. This essay acknowledges
the uncertainty involved but evades its full force by focusing on a particular
alternative future, what will be called here Bellum Americanum-American
war, the view of future war and warfare most prevalent in U.S. military circles.
Use of the model should be judged neither xenophobic nor ethnocentric.
Rather, it was selected because its vision is, in a relative sense, developmentally
mature. Moreover, as the construct of a
military
wielding significant influence over how even combined operations6 are
executed, the U.S. approach will likely exhibit determinative influence over
warfare's evolution for the foreseeable future.
After describing Bellum Americanum at some length, the essay turns to the
"stressors" it presents for the current law of armed conflict. The term
"stressors" is used to suggest that law evolves as it is stressed by changing
circumstances. Much as water seeks a constant level, law inevitably moves to
fill normative lacunae. Correspondingly, law loses its normative valence when
it no longer serves "community"-a relative concept-ends. Thus, law is
contextual and directional. It is contextual in the sense that it is understood
and applied based upon the specific social, economic, political, and military
milieu in which it operates. It is directional, for it is characterized by distinct

390

Michael Schmitt
vectors; its generation or demise is rarely spontaneous or random. Cognizant of
the suspect character of any predictive effort, then, this essay will describe and
analyze how the context of a notional future, Bellum Americanum, might affect
law substantively and directionally. Of course, only time can validate the
approach.
The U.S. Vision of the Twenty,First,Century
Political,Military Environmene
In the U.S. vision of the twenty,first,century world, the gap between rich
and poor States-between "have" and "have nots"-will continue to grow.
This chasm will result in great part from the ability of developed States to
leverage their comparative economic and technological advantages. At the
same time, global economic interdependence will increase due to specialization
in production by individual countries or blocs thereof. That interdependence
may play itself out in the form of regional trading blocs, possibly dominated by a
single State. As might be expected, State-centrism will continue to weaken in
the face of the growing influence of intergovernmental and nongovernmental
organizations, multinational corporations, and even terrorist groups and
international criminal syndicates.
Within the developed world, increased economic well,being and wider
diffusion of advanced technology will give a greater number of States the
wherewithal to play a consequential role on the international scene. In
particular, more States will be able to invest more in weapons acquisition.
Economic and technical prowess will also allow additional States to develop an
indigenous weapons production capability, a destabilizing trend that would
likely lead to further proliferation of high, technology weapons.s
On the other side of the chasm, the lesser and undeveloped countries will
suffer from declining standards ofliving. Citizens of the disadvantaged States will
be increasingly aware of their plight due to the pervasiveness of mass
communications. The result will be, at least in some areas, unrest and instability,
as the "have,nots" are sensitized to the gap between themselves and the "haves."
Regional conflict is expected to remain the major threat to international
peace and security,9 and there will be an increasing likelihood of asymmetrical
challenges. Stymied by the relative dominance of the United States and its
allies in conventional warfare, opponents, whether States or not, will consider
such unconventional means as weapons of mass destruction, information
warfare, and terrorism to strike less traditional centers of gravity. Many threats
will be transnational in nature-such as international drug and weapons trade;
391

Bellum Americanum
political, religious, or ethnic extremism; environmental damage-and the risk
of "wild card" events, i.e., unanticipated occurrences that fundamentally
change the international power scheme, will always be present.
Security specific visions of the next century are the byproduct of these larger
trends. 10 Military power will continue to be a major determinant of national
strength, though resort to force by developed States will most often be in
collaboration with others. Proliferation of conventional weapons will be
widespread, and the number of nuclear powers will grow. Military forces will
continue to be called on to conduct humanitarian operations and deter the
spread of regional conflict, as in the case of Bosnia.
In the developed world, militaries will become smaller, compensating for
their loss of personnel and equipment by leveraging technology to allow them
to fight asymmetrically against larger forces. ll Lesser developed but upwardly
mobile countries, particularly those which aspire to regional dominance, will
retain large standing armies because of the symbolism of such forces. Terrorism
will be a growing factor in military planning, particularly if terrorists acquire
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. 12
Warfare will become ever more driven by and dependent upon technology.
Advances in micro technology, biotechnology, and information technology will
radically transform the weapons of war and the way war is fought. So too will
assets. As society and
the growing dependence of the military on
warfare evolve, the desired targets of war will also shift. The goal will still be to
strike decisively at an enemy's center of gravity (or that of a target State or, in
situations short of armed conflict,
actor), but what constitutes a
center of gravity in the future may radically differ from those with which
warfighters are familiar todayY It is clear that the old paradigms of war and
warfare are being broken as we enter the next millennium.
The U.S. Response
In order to deal effectively with this uncertain geopolitical environment, the
United States has fashioned a national security strategy labeled "Engagement,"
the underlying premise of which is a rejection of isolationism in favor of the
post-World War II global involvement in world affairs-illustrated by the
Marshall Plan, NATO, the UN, the International Monetary Fund, the World
Bank, etc.-that is viewed as having won the Cold War. 14 Because there are no
adversaries, the military component of the strategy is capability,
vice threat, based. IS The goal, one that will likely continue in rough form into the
foreseeable future, is to "be able to deter and defeat nearly simultaneous,
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large,scale cross border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time
frames, preferably in concert with regional allies."16 This capability to fight and
win two major theater wars is complemented by the ability to conduct "multiple,
concurrent smaller,scale contingency operations,"17 such as limited strikes,
no,fly,zone enforcement, sanctions monitoring, or peacekeeping/enforcement
operations.
Operationally, these capabilities (and any others for which the need may
surface) will be achieved through "full spectrum dominance," the ability to
dominate warfare whether it occurs in space, the air, on land, or at sea, and
regardless of the level of hostilities. "Joint Vision 2010" is the U.S. articulation
of how this will be accomplished in the twenty,first century.1S It advances
operational concepts, made possible through technological innovation and
information superiority, that express how the United States will fight in the
future. Three are particularly relevant to this essay.
The first, "dominant maneuver," is "the multidimensional application of
information, engagement, and mobility capabilities to position and employ
widely dispersed joint air, land, sea and space forces."19 In the past, battlefields
were generally linear-fielded forces faced each other across a geographically
distinct line. In dominant maneuver warfare the battlefield is replaced by the
battlespace, with force being applied from a wide variety of precision platforms,
which are maneuvered in synchronization with other platforms to defeat a
target pinpointed by superior information capabilities.2o
"Precision engagement," the second operational concept, "will consist of a
system of systems that enables [U.S.] forces to locate the objective or target,
provide responsive command and control, generate the desired effect, assess
our level of success, and retain the flexibility to reengage with precision when
required."21 The concept of precision implies more than precise weapons; it is
the ability to achieve a desired effect on a specified objective. 22 Key to the
concept is a robust surveillance and reconnaissance capability and a collection
of weapons systems that can generate just the right degree and kind of effect.
Complementing precision engagement is "full,dimension protection," which
will employ information technology to enhance the survivability of U.S.
forces. 23 It is based on the truism that the easiest threat to deter is often a
known one.24
Conceptually, then, warfare as envisioned in "Joint Vision 2010" will be
fast,paced, mobile, and highly lethal. An array of information gathering and
processing assets will operate synergistically to generate greater situational
awareness of the battles pace and provide the means necessary to shape it.25 If
successful, the warfighter of tomorrow will be able to operate within the
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enemy's decision cycle. This alternative future will cause new law to surface
and highlight that which is no longer responsive to its context.
The Revolution in Military Affairs
The question du jour among those who focus on security issues is whether
these operational concepts are being made possible by a "revolution in military
affairs" (RMA).26 Revolutions in military affairs occur whenever the nature of
war and warfare fundamentally changesY For instance, Napoleon's use of the
citizen,soldier in the French army of the 1790s presaged war involving entire
societies. A more recent RMA occurred ,vith the advent of nuclear weapons. 28 In
the then, existing bipolar world, offsetting nuclear arsenals led to war by proxy
but deterred the major,power massive conflicts that had characterized
inter,State conflict during the past century and a half. As in other RMAs, new
weapons and defenses (e.g., nuclear mines and artillery, intercontinental ballistic
missiles, and antiballistic missile systems) were fielded, and new operational
concepts (e.g., limited nuclear options, extended deterrence, counterforce and
countervalue targeting) were developed.
When they occur, RMAs generate fundamental change in the normative
architecture of war. For instance, the carnage that resulted from the clash of
mass armies during the Napoleonic era motivated much of Hague law. Further,
the sheer size of the resulting conflicts, and the fact that they now often
occurred where civilians were, led to greater suffering by noncombatants;
Geneva law resulted. 29 So too ,vith the nuclear RMA. In the very short period
since nuclear weapons have been in existence, and despite only two uses of
atomic bombs, the global community has responded with treaties,30 attempts to
articulate customary law,3! and judicial opinions.32 The causal relationship
between RMAs and law is apparent.
In the u.S. view, an RMA is well under way. The United States sees
fundamental change in three areas: information operations, weapons systems,
and space.33 This author would add a fourth arena of change, one derivative of
the other three-militarization of civilians and of civilian activities. Bellum
Americanum clearly envisions a leveraging of the advantages offered by this
revolution.

Information Systems. 34 It would appear that Alvin and Heidi Toffler's "Third

Wave" is upon US.35 Most agree that the key to the RMA of the twenty,first
century will be information.36 Recognizing the importance of information in
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warfare hardly represents a strategic epiphany; however, in the next century
these capabilities will themselves be a key source of national power.37
Many of the powerful information technologies are next generation
improvements on current systems.38 For example, by the early part of the
twenty,first century, satellites will offer worldwide coverage any time of day
and with astonishing spatial resolution. The future may even include sound
sensors powerful enough to allow a satellite to detect conversations on earth.39
Advances in artificial intelligence will allow this data and that from other
sensors to be fused, organized, and disseminated almost instantaneously.
Even more fantastic are new technologies. Consider micromacruning.
Scientists now believe that in the future they will be able to build robots,
disguised as insects, that will have both optical and communications
capabilities. Such systems could be used in areas where current systems are
ineffective, like jungles with thick canopies. Some scientists believe that the
sensors may one day approach the size of dust mites40 and be seedable by
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). More amazing still, micromacruned sensors
may be able to taste and smell-useful senses when seeking out chemical
weapons or finding objects made with a particular substance, such as the metal
of military vehicles or aircraft.41 Of course, whether new or improved, sensor
technologies are no panacea, a fact well illustrated by the futile attempt to
destroy mobile Scuds during the Gulf WarY
The ultimate benefit of information technologies is that they allow the
warfighter to get inside his opponent's OODA-observe, orient, decide,
act-loop and shape the battlespace before his adversary can. This represents a
decisive advantage. For instance, in the noHoo,distant future the individual
soldier will be equipped with the Land Warrior Modular Fighting System. Its
components include a helmet,mounted computerized display tied to an
improved weapon with a thermal sensor capable of night vision and an image
enhancer for accuracy. The system will be capable of seeing around corners and
over barriers, and of digitizing images for transmission up the chain of
command. Soldiers of tomorrow will be able to view real, time "picture maps"
on eye,sized video displays. Not unexpectedly, they will also be equipped with
computers linked to others in their unit. The net result will inevitably be a
more lethal soldier, and one able to operate more autonomously in the heat of
battleY
Similar enhancements will pervade other arenas of armed conflict. Combat
aircraft will benefit from information gathered by sensors on other aircraft, as
well as space and ground,based sensors and uninhabited reconnaissance aerial
vehicles (URAV) .44 This will improve targeting precision, enhance
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survivability, and reduce the possibility of fratricide. Shipboard information
improvements may include the Force Threat Evaluation and Weapon
Assignment System, being tested by Johns Hopkins University. The system will
fuse data from all of a naval battle group's radars to create a three-dimensional
display containing graphics, rather than symbology, of threats; it will then
recommend which should be engaged and when. 45
At the operational (theater) and strategic levels of warfare, decision-making
will be enhanced by the new ctISR technologies. 46 Senior commanders will be
able to literally watch the battle unfold. The transparency of one's opponents
and the reliability and ease of communication with subordinate units will
produce an unprecedented operational tempo. In particular, access to
on-demand, real-time information will allow real-time planning, rather than
the current practice of executing plans developed in advance of the
engagement. 47
Lest information be considered a panacea, it must be recognized that the
technology proponents of the new era herald may generate little more than
additional Clausewitzian fog of war. For instance, microminiaturization will
enhance stealth (that is, low-observable/masking technologies, or LOMT), as
will active-radio-frequency and next-generation passive infrared capabilities.48
Similarly, by the removal of their pilot and cockpit-producing "uninhabited
combat aircraft vehicles" (UCAV)- aircraft can be designed with radar
cross-sections reduced by a factor of two (or four against area-surveillance
radars).49 A possible obstacle to transparency may be data overload-so much
information that human decision-makers become overtasked and overstressed,
and therefore make bad decisions.5o
Finally, the availability of the systems may breed unhealthy dependencies
-and vulnerabilities.51 Today the U.S. military alone has over 2.1 million
computers and ten thousand local area networks.52 Given their importance,
information systems will be key targets. Indeed, during the Gulf War they
represented the lead target set for Coalition attacks.53 If forces become
dependent on information resources, will they be able to operate in the event of
disruption?54 Will information enable the forces of tomorrow ... or cripple
them?

Weapons Systems. The second change underlying the RMA is a quantum leap
in weapons systems capabilities. It is an exaggerated continuation of a trend
that has been underway for some time. For instance, through 1943 the U.S.
Eighth Air Force attacked only fifty strategic targets in Germany. By contrast,
in 1991 Coalition air assets struck 150 strategic targets on the first day of the
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war alone.55 Improvements on this scale will continue into the twenty,first
century; they can be grouped into two categories, weapons systems
"intelligence" and weapons effect.
Advances in the first category are previewed by today's precision guided
munitions (PGMs), colloquially known as "smart" weapons. In the next
century, weapons systems will be much more than smart-they will be
"brilliant.,,56 The key is the concept of a weapon system. Twenty,first,century
weaponry will draw information from a wide variety of sources (a system), not
simply from the launcher or onboard sensors, to identify a target, strike it, and
report results. To illustrate, consider an attack on a suspected biological
weapons facility. Because of the risk that the attack could release biologicals,
precision is essential. One Air Force study describes the type of information
that would be gathered prior to such an attack:
In the year 2025, sensor collection provides enough data for a virtual 3,D model
of the [target) to include its composition, internal structure, baseline
characteristics, and tendencies. . . . Sensors determine the building's exact
dimensions and floor plan. They then highlight soft spots. Sensors distinguish
between rooms containing biological agents, test equipment, sleeping quarters,
and even the snack bar. Target acquisition sensors also construct a baseline, or
living archive, of data concerning routine activity and environmental
conditions. Examples include the average number of people who enter and exit
each day, the number of vehicles in the parking lot, and the level of noise
generated by the facility.57

Using this information, mission planners can determine when the facility
appears to be generating biologicals, where they are stored, and when it can be
struck without causing high numbers of civilian casualties.58 To destroy the
biologicals before they can be released into the atmosphere, a warhead will be
used that will actually count walls as it penetrates them to ensure explosion in
the proper room.59
Systems not only will be more capable of determining where to strike, they
will be better able to strike the exact point selected. With global positioning,
inertial navigation, and other guidance systems, in the not,too,distant future
accuracy will be measured in centimeters, not meters as it is today.60 Weapons
systems will also be much smaller due to miniaturized munitions technology
(MMT), thereby allowing more weapons to be carried.61 In the future, a single
UCAV carrying brilliant weapons for release far from the target may have the
same effect as a flight of manned aircraft that would today have to fight its way
to the release point.62
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The second fundamental change in weapons, that of effect, will abandon the
approach of this century, whereby most weaponry destroys through
penetration and explosive force. In the twenty,first century the continuum of
effect will be multidimensional; explosives will predominate but be much more
refined. For example, microtechnology will make possible micro explosives,
mere grams of which can destroy targets. 63 At the other end of the spectrum,
nonlethal weapons (also known as "less lethal," inasmuch as they still have the
capacity to kill) will increasingly be employed to limit collateral damage and
incidental injury during armed conflict and provide commanders greater
tactical flexibility during peace operations.64
The variety of nonlethals being considered is impressive. Acoustic weapons
can produce sound frequencies that disorient, cause pain, and bring on nausea.
Microwave weapons will be able to induce seizures or simply bring on
discomfort by raising the target's body temperature.6S There is even some
discussion of sleep,inducing agents.66 Nonlethals can also incapacitate
weapons and equipment. Electromagnetic,pulse weapons generate
radio,frequency wavelengths that damage electrical components, usually
without causing direct harm to humans.67 Supercaustics and liquid
metal,embrittlement agents will attack surfaces, the former by corroding them
(bridges, optical lenses, roads, tires, etc.), the latter by making them brittle and
thereby liable to fracture in use. Both could be delivered by shell or sprayed
from an aircraft. 68 Microbes that eat rubber, silicon, electronics, and even oil
have also been mentioned as possibilities.69 Seemingly more benign are
"stick, urns" and "slick,ums." The first uses polymers that form a sticky foam
capable of immobilizing humans without killing them; a variant is a "super
glue" that can be dispensed from the air to foul weapons and equipment
components. Slick,ums, by contrast, coat surfaces with an antitraction
chemical that make them difficult to walk or drive upon. 70
Finally, given the reliance of future war on information systems, it is
inevitable that weapons will be developed to attack them. Such traditional
tactics as jammers or missiles that home in on specific electronic signals will
continue to be refined. More revolutionary will be attacks on computer
networks, sometimes called "hacker war." This form of warfare includes
sending computer viruses into an adversary's computer system to destroy or
alter data and programs. For example, "logic bombs" can be introduced that sit
idle in a computer system, awaiting activation at the occurrence of a particular
event or a set time; an air defense system logic bomb might be set to "explode"
only when the missile launch sequence is initiated. Other techniques for
disrupting an information system are as simple as flooding it with false
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information, or using "sniffer" programs to collect access codes that allow entry
into a target system. 71 In some cases, such attacks may occur without revealing
the source, or even the fact, of the attack.

Space. The third defining aspect of the current RMA is the use of space. In
much the same way that the airplane revolutionized twentieth,century warfare
by opening a third medium from, through, and in which to fight, so too will
access to space revolutionize warfare in the twenty,first. The value of space
operations was illustrated dramatically during the Gulf War. 72 By the
twenty,first century, they will transform how war is fought, the lethality that
can be brought to bear against military objectives, the degree and nature of
collateral damage and incidental injury to civilians and civilian objects, and
even where conflict will occur. Space, after all, is the ultimate high ground,
that objective that militaries have sought since the first combat; the fact that it
is a high ground ofinfinite depth renders it more valuable still. 73
Control of space, then, is an alluring prospect. The United States Space
Command envisions space control-the ability to defend one's own space
assets from space or ground,based threats while denying the use of space to an
opponent.74 The reasoning is clear:
[S)o important are space systems to military operations that it is unrealistic to
imagine that they will never become military targets. Just as land dominance, sea
control, and air superiority have become critical elements of current military
strategy, space superiority is emerging as an essential element of battlefield
success and future warfare .... An increased dependence on space capabilities
may lead to increased vulnerabilities. As space systems become lucrative military
targets, there will be a critical need to control the medium to ensure U.S.
dominance on future battlefields. Robust capabilities to ensure space superiority
must be developed-just as they have been for land, sea, and air. 75

Should space control operations become a reality, the next logical step is
force projection from space. Not surprisingly, the USAF Scientific Advisory
Board is already discussing such possibilities as space,based lasers, or
space,based mirrors to direct lasers on the ground. 76 Space is clearly the next
arena of warfare in the Bellum Americanum.

Militarization of Civilians and Civilian Activities. The final factor
revolutionizing warfare is a growing military dependency on civilians, and on
civilian objects and activities. This continues a trend that began with
Napoleonic warfare and the advent of the Industrial Revolution. By the time of
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the Second World War, civilians and civilian objects were being attacked
directly, reflecting their criticality to military forces. In the future, the
relationship with civilians and civilian activities will be closer still. As
drawdowns in military forces occur in the developed world, many of the
activities traditionally performed by military personnel are being assumed by
civilian contractors. For example, the U.S. military is contracting out aircraft
maintenance, facilities maintenance, base security, transportation,
communications, and the feeding and housing of troops. Increasingly, it is
approaching a point where "member of the armed forces" will be synonymous
with
Moreover, as emphasis shifts to information operations, equipment becomes
less identifiable as military in character. The push to purchase
products in order to lower acquisition costs means that a device's character is a
matter of the use to which it is put. Indeed, the bulk of information operations
hardware and software comprises commercial products adapted to military use.
As former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Owens,
has noted,
Today, the center of technological acceleration in each of these technologies
[battlespace awareness, C4I, and precision use of force) lies generally in the
commercial, non-defense sectors. Our ability to accelerate the fielding of
systems, on which we will base our future military superiority, thus depends on
our capacity to tap into developments taking place for the most part outside the
existing Department of Defense laboratory and development infrastructure.77

Compounding the difficulty of distinguishing civilian from military is the
fact that to keep costs low, many facilities-ranging from office buildings to
airports-are shared by military and civilian operations. Such sharing is
particularly likely with
assets because of the cost of putting them in
orbit. Thus, Space Command is actively seeking partnerships with commercial
entities and consortiums, sometimes multinational in character, as well as with
civilian agencies (e.g., NASA) involved in space operations. It also seeks links
with foreign and international space operators, such as the European Space
Agency.78
The Legal Implications of Bellum Americanum
As noted at the outset, the context in which law operates determines its
content. Changing contexts cause stress to existing normative architectures,
causing new law to emerge, or outdated and irrelevant law to fade away. The
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remainder of this essay will shift from the predictive to the speculative,
suggesting certain stressors found in Bellum Americanum and their possible
effects on the current law of armed conflict. 79 The catalog is neither exhaustive
nor definitive, but merely the reflections of one writer on the possible
implications of one alternative future. Moreover, the analysis is not an effort to
suggest lexferenda. The goal is to posit probable normative vectors, rather than
offer aspirational visions of the
century.

Jus ad Bellum. Bellum Americanum will stress the current jus ad bellum in a
number of significant ways. Most fundamentally, the concept of war and
peace--of the difference between an act that is merely unfriendly and one that
is wrongful as a threat or use of force under Article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter8o-will be strained. In particular, because information operations
"attack" an adversary without actually employing force in the kinetic sense,
they will raise serious questions about what constitutes "force."s1 Should the
term include
or
hacker attacks on a
country's banks, communications networks, or stock exchange? Does it make a
difference if the operations are conducted to "prepare the battlefield" in
anticipation of an actual conflict by, for instance, destroying military
deployment plans and reserve force records, corrupting intelligence systems, or
the Article 39
sending satellites off course? Similar stressors exist
threats to the peace, breaches of peace, or acts of aggression that empower the
Security Council to authorize Chapter VII responses. S2 Moreover, the
both under Article
information era will challenge the concept of
51 and the inherent right found in customary international law. Under what
circumstances might a State be justified in responding with force to an
information attack? Might such an attack constitute an "armed attack" under
Article 51?83 When maya State use information operations in anticipation of
an armed attack?s4
Arguably, such stressors might move the jus ad bellum in the direction of a
regime based on consequences, vice acts. In the current normative scheme, the
consequences of an act are often less important than its nature. For instance, a
devastating economic embargo is not a "use of force" or an "armed attack"
justifying forcible
even though the embargo may result in
s5
enormous suffering. On the other hand, a relatively minor armed incursion
across a border may constitute both a use of force and an armed attack.86 This
contrary result derives from the law's use of "acts" as a cognitive shorthand for
what really matters-consequences. Acts are more easily expressed (to "use
force" versus to cause a certain quantum and quality of harm) and more easily
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discerned than a standard based on effects, on the harm suffered. This
synecdoche does not work well in the age of information operations because
information attacks, . albeit potentially disastrous, may be physically
imperceptible. Thus, as the nature of an hostile act becomes less determinative
ofits consequences, current notions of "lawful" coercive behavior by States and
the appropriate responses thereto are likely to evolve accordingly.
Even beyond information warfare, the reality of military operations in the
next century will stress existing distinctions between a premature use of
"defensive" force and valid self,defense. In tomorrow's high,tech battle the
first shot may be the last. As weapons become more lethal, the incentive to
strike first grows, 87 and the threshold for preemption in self,defense on the basis
of
hostile intent drops precipitously.ss
Bellum Americanum may also call into question jus in bellum participatory
notions. Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the rise of the
nation,State, war has been the province, and until the turn of this century the
prerogative, of States. When non,State actors have participated in organized
violence, the normative paradigm has been that of international and domestic
criminal law, not the law of armed conflict. Even the involvement of
international organizations is a relatively new phenomenon.
Yet if the U.S. vision is accurate, in the next century military forces will
increasingly face non,State actors, ranging from terrorists to drug cartels. As
that occurs, there will be growing pressure to articulate neoteric legal
justifications for forceful responses. Consider Operation EL DORADO
CANYON, the 1986 strike on targets in Libya in response to Libyan,supported
terrorist attacks against Americans in Europe, including the La Belle Disco
bombing in Berlin. Though justified at the time in terms of self,defense, it has
been difficult to articulate the instant and overwhelmingS9 need to resort to
force once those bombings had taken place.90 Or consider a hypothetical
well,guarded drug laboratory in a remote region: under current international
law, there is no legal basis for bombing the facility if more traditional law
enforcement techniques fail. Or consider even a terrorist group that acquires
biological weapons but is sheltered by a rogue State. Again, under present law
there are no grounds for attacking the group until the point when it actually
employs (or is about to employ) the weapons. If twenty,first,century national
security threats are to come from non,State actors, then the law governing the
resort to force is bound to evolve in a way that permits an effective defense
against them. This will necessitate either blurring the State-non,State actor
distinction or sharpening it by a new body of law governing actions against
non,State actors.
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The Jus in Bello Generally. In terms of the jus in bello, the differentiation
between international and non,international conflict will continue to be
strained.91 Bellum Americanum sees more Bosnias on the horizon, as ethnic and
religious tensions remain divisive. The applicative difficulties posed by the
conceptually "neat" distinction between international and non, international
armed conflicts-Additional Protocol II and common Articles 3 of the Geneva
Conventions versus Additional Protocol I and the Conventions in their
entirety92-have been well illustrated in the seemingly contradictory
conclusions regarding conflict status issued by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.93 The difficulty of fitting future conflicts
into what William Fenrick has labeled the "two box" approach will create
pressures to dissolve the distinction.94 Resistance to this pressure will come, of
course, from States who jealously guard their autonomy. Thus, the natural
tension between humanitarian concerns and sovereignty, a tension evidenced
in such issues as humanitarian intervention, will worsen as attempts are made
to determine which law applies to which twenty,first,century conflicts.

Discrimination. Discrimination is a general principle of the law of armed
conflict that requires an attacker to distinguish between civilians and civilian
objects on one hand and military objectives (combatants or objects) on the
other, and to use weapons capable of that discrimination.95 Paradoxically,
despite vast improvement in weapons systems accuracy and battlespace
transparency, complying with the principle may become increasingly difficult.96
The problem is that the lines between lawful targets and protected objects will
blur due to the growing dependency on civilians and civilian activities during
military operations.
The Additional Protocol I approach to ascertaining military objectives is
relatively restrictive. Before an object may be deemed a legitimate target, it
must "make an effective contribution to military action" and its destruction
must offer the attacker a "definite military advantage.'197 Objects which make
an effective contribution are those that are by nature beneficial to the military
effort: weapons, aircraft, communications, etc. "Definite military advantage"
refers to objects which contribute by virtue of their location (bridges, buildings
used for shelter, etc.); such objects may not be attacked if only a "potential or
indeterminate" advantage is anticipated.98 Civilians may not be attacked99
unless taking "direct part in the hostilities."lOoThe International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) commentary to the Protocol defines "direct" as "acts of
war which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the
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personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces."lOl When doubt exists, a
presumption of civilian status attaches. loz
The degree of nexus between the object or individual to be attacked and
military operations is already the subject of considerable debate. l03 The United
States generally opposes any interpretation as restrictive as that propounded by
the ICRC. l04 For instance, the U.S. Army has issued a legal opinion that
civilians working at U.S. bases during an armed conflict
would be appropriate targets of attack by the enemy.lOS Moreover, the most
recent of the U.S. military manuals, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of
Naval Operations, states that "[e] conomic targets that indirectly but effectively
support and sustain the enemy's
capability may ... be attacked."lc6
While this is not the place to resolve the debate, it is clear that a further
blurring of the distinction can only increase pressures to render the standard
less restrictive. By what logic, for example, would a civil engineer responsible
for rapid runway repair at Base X be immune from direct attack when his
military counterpart at Base Y would not be? An analogous dilemma is
presented by objects. By current standards a munitions factory is a valid target.
warfare, would not
Given the essentiality of computers in
a Microsoft plant also offer an
military advantages that
would merit a place for it on an air tasking order? Might the Internet itselfbe a
lawful target?
The operational principle of "dominant maneuver" set forth in "Joint Vision
2010" is a further potential stressor for the principle of discrimination. As
battle becomes virtual and nonlinear, as battlefields are transformed into
battlespaces, military objectives and civilians and civilian objects will be
increasingly intermingled. This diminishes the de facto protection formerly
provided by distance from the forward edge of the battle area. While it is true
maneuver warfare of, for example, the German blitzkrieg
that the
made it difficult to achieve this protection, the difference from prior warfare
was quantitative, not qualitative-civilians could still flee the onslaught.
Dominant maneuver generates a qualitative evolution because, at least in
belligerent territory, there are far fewer places to which to flee, perhaps none.
Similarly, in the past strategic bombing could be avoided by moving from the
vicinity of strategic targets. In the
century, by contrast, both the
tactical and strategic fight may occupy the same space. Thus, civilians might
move away from strategic targets (factories, storage facilities, etc.) only to find
themselves in the midst of battle proper. l07
This reality is likely to encourage strengthened obligations for precaution in
attack, particularly target verification. lOS The information environment and
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existence of brilliant weaponry will ease compliance, should this occur. One
potential downside of the greater transparency of targets may well be that it
encourages placement of military personnel and equipment near protected
objects or persons in the hope that the other side will hesitate to attack lest
harm befall them. The use by Saddam Hussein of civilians and cultural sites as
shields is well knownj l09 indeed, since the conflict ended Iraqi civilians have
flooded potential targets on numerous occasions to protect them in the face of
threatened air attacks, against which the Iraqi military would likely prove
impotent. lIo In much the same way that Iraqi use of these tactics should not be
particularly surprising, given their weakness vis,8.,vis their opponents, the risk
of similar practices in the notional asymmetrical battles of Bellum Americanum
is especially high.
Perhaps an even more ominous prospect is that transparency may place a
premium on perfidious acts by potential targets. 111 If I cannot hide, perhaps I
can survive by appearing to the enemy to be other than what I am. In fact, the
relaxation of the criteria for combatant status in the past decades is historical
precedent supporting such a likelihood. Recall that under the Regulations
annexed to Hague Convention IV, combatants were members of the regular
armed forces (or formal militia), were commanded by a person responsible for
their conduct, wore a fixed distinctive emblem (or uniform), carried their
weapons openly, and conducted operations in accordance with the law of
war.112 The 1949 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War extended this status
to members of an organized resistance movement which otherwise complied
with the Hague IV requirements. l13 This change was one of status, not acts.
Thus, for example, Josip Broz Tito's guerrillas would have fallen within the
definition.
As the nature of warfare evolved in the postwar period from primarily State
on State to that of wars of national liberation and the like, many of the forces
involved declined to distinguish themselves or carry weapons openly. The
reason was quite practical. Facing a militarily superior force which occupied
much of the territory in which they were operating, guerrilla fighters could not
possibly make themselves so conspicuous and have any chance of successy4
This fact was recognized in Additional Protocol 1's Article 44 exception for
situations where "owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant
cannot so distinguish himself." In such cases, a combatant need only carry his
arms openly "during each military engagement" and "during such time as he is
visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding
the launching of an attack."U5 Law responded to practicalities that rendered
compliance difficult or dangerous for particular participants in the conflict.
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The pervasiveness of surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities in
warfare can only serve to exacerbate this trend, as the
disincentives against distinctive clothing, etc., swell for many combatants. In
light of the technology that will be available, even revealing themselves briefly
during or immediately preceding an attack will prove risky. How States react to
this reality will be driven by their perspective on the humanitarian issues
presented. But just as it is not surprising that States who might be expected to
face guerrillas tended to oppose Article 44 while those that either had arisen
from guerrilla movements or were unlikely ever to face one did not, States
which enjoy a technological advantage can be expected to resist further
erosion of the standard. Those which are technologically disadvantaged may
not.
A final aspect of the Bellum Americanum that may prove a stressor for
discrimination is the use of nonlethal weapons. Nonlethals, while less deadly,
tend to be less discriminatory. A slicbum will render a road treacherous for
whoever passes down it, and an acoustic device is as likely to make a child
playing nearby sick as it is to keep potential attackers away from a pedmeter.
Interestingly, the use of nonlethals derives from a desire to foster
proportionality in warfare-less precise weapons are employed in lieu of more
lethal ones. Accordingly, there will be significant support for relaxing the
demands of discrimination when it conflicts with efforts to enhance
proportionality by limiting the quantum of collateral damage and incidental
injury.

Proportionality. Proportionality is the general principle in the law of armed
conflict that prohibits means and methods of warfare that cause collateral
damage to civilian objects, or incidental injury to civilians, disproportionate to
the military advantage sought. 116 The "Joint Vision 2010" operational concept
of precision engagement enabled by information systems and brilliant
weaponry is likely to push traditional proportionality calculations toward a
point where immediately foreseeable collateral damage or incidental injury is
unacceptable, at least when caused by a technologically advanced military.ll7
In the
century, the mere possibility of such damage may cause
mission planners, or even individual soldiers, to shift to different weapons or
tactics.
Collateral damage and incidental injury have historically been the product
of three factors: (1) lack offull knowledge as to what is being hit; (2) inability to
meter the amount of force being applied to the targetj and (3) inability to
ensure that a weapon strikes precisely the right point. With regard to the first,
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consider the AVAmariyah bunker incident.u s Some three hundred
noncombatants were killed during the Persian Gulf War when U.S. aircraft,
unaware that civilians had entered the Iraqi command and control bunker
during the night, destroyed it. As to weapons availability and capability,
extended gaps along the continuum of force remain. For instance, because
nonlethals are absent from the inventory of most militaries, forces sent into a
crowd, control or perimeter,defense situation have nothing to resort to
between warnings or warning shots and the use of deadly force. Finally, in
terms of accuracy-and despite the morbidly spectacular film of PGM strikes
during the Persian Gulf War-the reality is that many weapons continue to
lack fully reliable precision guidance. Today, for instance, fighter,bombers still
"toss," "dive bomb," or simply drop the majority of their weapons, which in
most cases are unguided, general,purpose bombs.ll9
Each of these obstacles will eventually be overcome by technology.
"Shooters" will be able to know what is they are hitting, and to hit it with a
weapon that applies only the amount of force necessary to destroy or disable it.
Accuracy will be nearly 100 percent. The commander, planner, and shooter
will no longer have to carefully weigh expected collateral damage and
incidental injury against the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated j 120 properly planned and executed, an attack should necessarily
result in de minimus collateral damage or incidental injury.
But civilian casualties will inevitably occur, and civilian objects will be
damaged and destroyed-even in the twenty,first century. The evaluation of
such results will tum on the exercise of "due care" in analyzing the target and
selecting weapons and tactics. Of course, this standard is operative today in
Article 57 of Additional Protocol I and in customary internationallaw. 121 The
difference in the future will be the complexity of the process, given the greater
availability of target information, wider selection of weapons, and the
discrimination difficulties noted above. The Al } Amariyah bunker provides a
prototype of the concerns that will surround collateral damage and incidental
injury. In that case the weapon selected was the GBU,28, a
five,thousand,pound, laser,guided bomb able to penetrate twenty feet of
concrete before exploding. It was just the right weapon to use, because though
it would destroy the bunker, its laser guidance and the bunker's thick walls
rendered collateral damage and incidental injury outside the bunker unlikely.
The question, therefore, was not whether the ensuing deaths outweighed the
military advantage gained in destroying this important Iraqi command and
control facility, but whether the planners knew or should have known there were
civilians therein.
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Nonetheless, proportionality, as traditionally understood, will retain its
utility in assessing reverberating effects, i.e., those effects not directly caused by
the attack but rather by firsHier damage. The most often cited example is the
attack on the Iraqi electrical grid during the GulfWar. 122 That attack severely
degraded Iraqi command, control, and air defenses; unfortunately, it also
denied electricity to the civilian population, thereby affecting hospitals,
refrigeration, emergency response capabilities, and so forth. This type of
problem will only be exacerbated in the next century due to the
interconnectedness of military and civilian functions. For instance, an attack
on a satellite providing weather data necessary for flight operations may deny
that information to agriculture, disaster relief operations, etc. Destruction of a
satellite providing position data may likewise endanger civilian aircraft or ships
by denying them essential navigational information. Shutting down a
computer used to direct rail traffic, in an effort to disrupt the military logistic
chain, may cause shortages of essential civilian goods. The spreading
dependence on highly interconnected information and communications
systems implies particular risks of reverberating effects during information
warfare. These future realities will impel proportionality calculations towards a
macro view of collateral damage and incidental injury.123

Military Necessity. The full,spectrum dominance envisioned in Bellum
Americanum will surely stress, in an unintended way, traditional understandings
of military necessity.124 Under current norms, an actor must be able to
articulate the imperative military advantage to be gained by an attack. "There
must be some reasonable connection between the destruction of property [or
individuals] and the overcoming of the enemy forces."l25 The problem is that as
one faces an opponent capable of military domination across the diverse
spectrum of war, one inevitably considers asymmetrical attacks, possibly using
unconventional means.
The Iraqi Scud missile attacks against Israeli population centers were
portentously archetypal. In no way did the attacks contribute to directly
overcoming Iraq's enemies; Israel was not even involved in the conflict. Yet the
apparent randomness of the attacks disguised a clever attempt to fragment the
coalition by drawing in the Israelis and thereby putting Arab Coalition
members in the position of being supported by Israelis in an attack on fellow
Arabs. Facing full,spectrum dominance, Saddam Hussein was seeking
psychological means to weaken the forces facing him. 1Z6
History teaches that forces facing vastly superior opponents often resort to
seemingly random acts of violence. As incidents ranging from the bombing of
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the King David Hotel in Jerusalem to that of the Khobar Towers in Riyadh
demonstrate, when frustrated in battle disadvantaged opponents often carry
the fight beyond the fields of fire in order to rupture alliances, cause an enemy
to lose the will to fight, or weaken public or international support for their
dominance becomes a reality, acts that
adversary's war effort. If
would seem wanton or random-that is, not militarily necessary-are likely to
be all that remain to the disadvantaged side. This may cause the concept of
military necessity to slip over time, in much the same way that practicalities
have caused a relaxation in the criteria for combatant status.
Humanity. By contrast, Bellum Americanum exhibits stressors which may
suggest a heightening of the standards of humanity, a concept initially
expressed in the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 in connection with
prohibiting means of warfare that "uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled
men, or render their death inevitable." m The maturation of the principles of
proportionality and necessity has subsumed much of humanity's original
meaning; after all, to the extent suffering is useless it is militarily unnecessary
and, because it offers no direct and concrete military advantage,
disproportionate. What remains are ab initio prohibitions on methods and
means of warfare that are not so much inhumane as inhuman. We intuitively
recognize them as wrongful regardless of the context in which they occur. To
some extent, they are acts which violate the "dictates of public conscience,"128
acts that civilized people just do not do.
There has been a clear trend in the direction of prohibiting weapons on the
basis of humanity, most recently evidenced by the Chemical Weapons, 129
Biological \Veapons,130 Conventional Weapons,131 and
Mines 132 conventions. There is little doubt that each of the prohibited weapons
can be employed in specific scenarios so as to cause minimal suffering and little
risk to civilians or civilian objects. The use of tear gas to protect a facility is
more humane than firing a rifle. Similarly, Protocol IV of the Conventional
\Veapons Convention forbids the use of permanently blinding lasers, thereby
driving soldiers to the use oflethal force to protect themselves.133 The rationale
for these and analogous cases is humanity. However much sense it might make
in a particular context, civilized human beings do not blind or poison each
other, and therefore such behavior is outlawed.
Recall just some of the weapons imagined above for the
century-acoustic weapons that induce vomiting, microwaves that cause the
human body to heat up, and electromagnetic pulses that will cause an airplane
to fall to the earth after its engines shut down. Such weapons may be humane in
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certain circumstances, but there is little doubt that many individuals will react
to them viscerally as inhuman. Given the current trend in
conventions, we can expect many of these weapons to be targeted for
prohibition, regardless of their military necessity or the possibilities they offer
for proportionate use.

Treaty Regimes. War as envisioned in Bellum Americanum will stress a number
of treaty regimes. For instance, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention
prohibits the development, stockpile, acquisition, or retention of "microbial or
other biological agents, or toxins in quantities that have no justification for
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes" and of "weapons,
equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile
purposes or in armed conflict."134 By this standard, the use of microbes capable
of "eating" rubber, silicon, electronics, or oil is likely to be forbidden. Similarly,
the 1972 Chemical \Y/ eapons Convention prohibits parties from developing,
acquiring, stockpiling, or using chemical weapons. Chemical weapons include
toxic chemicals which through their "chemical action on life processes can
cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or
animals."m Many supercaustics and metal embrittlement agents could
certainly fall into this category, and there is little doubt that
agents would.
A particular challenge posed by Bellum Americanum is to the current legal
regime of space. There are a number of conventions which limit military
activities in space, the Outer Space Treaty having the widest scope. 136 Article I
of the treaty creates a res communis, res nullius area by providing that" [0] uter
space ... shall be the province of all mankind ... [and] ... shall be free for
exploration and use by all States." Article ill requires all activities in space be
carried on "in the interest of maintaining international peace and security" and
restricts use of the moon and other celestial bodies to "peaceful purposes."m
These provisions would appear at odds with the conception of space
operations set forth in "Joint Vision 2010" and by both the U.S. Space
Command and the U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. How, for
example, does the operational concept of space control, which includes denial
of the use of space to the enemy, comport with the Article I requirement that it
be preserved for use by all States? How can concepts of force projection be
squared with the reservation of space for peaceful purposes? Indeed, how can
the centrality of space to the U.S. vision of warfare in the
century
be at all consistent with the treaty prohibitions?
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In fact, the inconsistency is not as substantial as might at first glance appear.
First, there is no prohibition on the placement of weapons in space, only upon
weapons of mass destruction. Thus, whether or not their use is prohibited, their
development and emplacement would not be. More fundamentally, whether or
not the treaty would survive the outbreak of hostilities is the subject of vigorous
debate.
Under classical international law, treaties did not retain their.effect during
armed conflict; war existed beyond the realm of international relationsbellum omnium contra omnes. The more modem approach accepts the survival
of certain legal relationship between opposing belligerents.138 Three schools of
thought characterize this camp. The first maintains that whereas some legal
relations survive, treaties do not. A second group argues that treaties survive
armed conflict unless their existence is fundamentally contrary to the
existence of conflict, as for example a collective defense treaty between two
adversaries would be. The third approach, the "theory of differentiation," takes
a iniddle ground, asking whether continued vitality of the treaty in" question is
consistent with the larger context in which it operates (such as the existence of
Parties not involved in the conflict).139
This area oflaw remains unsettled, particularly when applied in the context
of a multilateral treaty governing an entire dimension of the earth,space
environment. Nevertheless, the fervor of the debate can only be exacerbated
by Bellum Americanum's emphasis on space,based operations. As this occurs,
calls to establish some degree of normative clarity are certain to be heard.
Clarity will also surely be sought over the concept of the reservation of space
for "peaceful purposes." There is a long,standing dispute over the latter term,
with some arguing that peaceful purposes should be understood to be
"nonmilitary," whereas others, including the United States, interpret it as
meaning "nonaggressive.,,140 Any military activities conducted under a UN
Chapter VII mandate, pursuant to the Article 51 right to individual or
collective self,defense, or consistent with the inherent right of self,defense
under customary international law' would by definition be nonaggressive. As
some States begin to enjoy full,spectrum dominance grounded in great part on
space,based assets, whereas others without the resources to exploit space are
rendered vulnerable by their relative nonparticipation in the space regime, the
peaceful,uses issue is likely to resurface as a major substantive point of
international discord.

Dissemination. In Bellum Americanum, the ability to direct lethal force is
increasingly pushed down the chain of command. Individual soldiers, sailors, or
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airmen of the twenty,first century will have far more information on which to
base the decision to employ force than have their twentieth,century
counterparts. Moreover, they will control a wider spectrum of force, capable of
being applied with greater precision. Thus, they will be both more and less
lethal, and operate more autonomously than ever before. This will drive a need
for relatively complex training in the law of armed conflict at far lower levels.
Future warfare will therefore move current law of armed conflict dissemination
requirements toward reinforcement and strengthening, and it will increase the
importance oflegal advisers.Hl

Nonnative Relativism. As the gap between the military "haves" and "have
nots" widens, there will be subtle stressors that encourage an interpretation of
the law of armed conflict relative to the State to which it is applied. For
instance, due to their high cost, not all States can afford the precision
munitions that help foster discrimination and proportionality. State A, which
cannot afford them, is not criticized when it drops an unguided bomb that
causes incidental injuries that are proportional to the military advantage
gained. However, when State B, which can afford PGMs, elects to employ an
unguided bomb in lieu of a precision weapon, it must justify that decision as
reasonable in the circumstances (e.g., preserving PGMs for other targets which
present a greater risk of collateral damage and incidental injury). In abstracto,
an identical standard is applied to both States-a requirement to minimize
collateral damage and incidental injury. In practice, however, the developed
State is held to a higher standard.
In the high, technology war of the twenty,first century this reality will be
exaggerated many,fold, as the gap between "haves" and "have nots" widens. If
State A has limited sensor capabilities whereas State B's are robust, must State
B reasonably exhaust those capabilities to ensure the target is what B believes it
to be? Or will it only be held to the standard of care imposed on A? In all
likelihood, the answer lies in the teleological underpinnings of the law of armed
conflict. It is no longer a body oflaw designed to ensure a fair fight between two
opponents; on battlefields of the twentieth and twenty,first centuries, the law
of chivalry has been overtaken by humanitarian law. Today, the law of armed
conflict is designed primarily to minimize suffering and prevent unnecessary
destruction. This being so, belligerents are held to the standards to which they
are capable of rising. The sole exceptions are absolute prohibitions, such as the
direct targeting of civilians or the use of poison.
This normative relativism may take on a new form in the next century. If the
economic and technological gap widens as the alternative future set forth
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above suggests it will, the move towards a capability,based humanitarian
regime may play itself out in an obligation to field weapons that pose the least
risk to protected persons and objects. 142 Some may even argue that if a wealthy
State has the economic wherewithal to arm its forces with precision weapons, it
should be obligated to do so. Similarly, it may be argued that if it has access to
nonlethal weapons, its forces must be armed with them so long as doing so is
otherwise operationally sound. This subtle shift from dictating tactics to
dictating public policy may well prove a by,product of the "haves-have nots"
polarization of the twenty,first century.
The polarization may also determine the position States take toward law of
armed conflict codification efforts. For logical reasons, States likely to be the
target of a particular mean or method of warfare are most likely to support its
prohibition; those likely to use it will generally oppose its banning. Thus, for
example, the United States opposes the Ottawa treaty on antipersonnel mines
in part because it sees great utility for the weapon on the Korean Peninsula.143
Similarly, the United States, which will remain the major space power into the
next century, interprets the Outer Space Treaty quite liberally. Given the
technological gap between militaries that will emerge in the twenty,first
century, there are certain to be attempts to offset weaknesses through bans on
weaponry and its use. Support for such efforts, whether motivated by genuine
humanitarian concerns or a clear,eyed view of one's own military impotence,
will be determined in great part by the extent to which a State enjoys the
benefits of Bellum Americanum.
Of course, one must always be careful of what one wishes for. The
"haves,have nots" dichotomy is driven by war,fighting concerns; opposition to
weaponry may not always be positive in terms ofhurnanitarian principles. After
all, much of the weaponry on the drawing boards will effectively reduce
collateral damage and incidental injury to civilians and civilian objects. States
likely neither to use new weapons nor be the target thereof will, therefore, play
a vital role as "honest,brokers" in maintaining the humanitarian raison d'etre of
the law.
Concluding Thoughts
Only time will tell whether the alternative future that has here been labeled
Bellum Americanum will be realized. To the extent that it is, law can be
expected to respond reactively and proactively to it. The normative
consequences, some of which have been suggested above, are likely to be
momentous. Assessments of whether such changes are steps forward or
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backwards will often depend on one's perspective-nationality, ethical and
humanitarian values, economic station in life, etc. Nevertheless, regardless of
the conclusions individual cognitive contexts lead us to, there are portents of
danger on the horizon for humanitarian principles. The line between war and
peace and between inter' and intra,State conflict may become dangerously
vague. Discrimination is placed at risk by growing militarization of civilians and
civilian activities. The widening gap between military "haves" and "have,nots"
will encourage disadvantaged forces to fight asymmetrically in ways that stress,
possibly even violate, current normative parameters. Finally, the risk of warfare
extending into a new arena-space-is looming.
In light of these risks and the fact that a revolution of military affairs is upon
us, perhaps the international community should take an increasingly proactive
approach to normative change. As new technologies in warfare are brought on
line, the disincentives for the "haves" to abandon or limit them will be high, as
will the incentives for the "have,nots" to defeat them through other than
conventional means. In a world evolving as rapidly as today's, time is of the
essence. Of course, this is not to suggest codification for the sake of
codification. Some weapons and operational concepts foster humanitarian
ends. The point is that the time to think clearly about twenty,first,century war
and what can be done to shape it is now.
In closing, it is worth noting that one objectively valid threat to a normative
architecture which fosters world order in the twenty,first century is the
seeming isolation of the acts of future warriors. The further removed they are
from their acts of war, the more difficult it will be for them to retain the
humanitarian spirit that underlies the law of armed conflict. It is one thing to
push a button while flying through the sky surrounded only by clouds; it is quite
another to watch a human being one has shot bleed to death. The latter act
brings home much more vividly the moral significance of the authority to use
deadly force that one has been entrusted with. As we enter the next
millennium, we must not lose sight of the reality of armed conflict, a reality
found only in the consequence of an act, not the act itself.
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Expectations: Why Technology Predictions Go Awry, TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, July 1991, at 39.
6. Joint operations are those which include forces of more than one service. Combined
operations include forces of more than one State.
7. This vision is based primarily on JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, CONCEPT FOR FUTURE
JOINT OPERATIONS: EXPANDING JOINT VISION 2010, at 8-9 (1997) [hereinafter CFJO). See
also U.S. SPACE COMMAND, VISION FOR 2020, n.p. (1997) [hereinafter SPACE COMMAND
VISION). Note that the term "vision" is employed here because itis the term used within the U.S.
military when articulating views of the future. It is predictive rather than aspirational in nature.
For example, it is not the U.S. desire to see the gap, discussed infra, between technologically
advanced and technologically disadvantaged States grow.
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8. On the proliferation threat from both State and non-State actors, see OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND REsPONSES (1996).
9. The National Security Strategy categorizes the threats described herein as: regional
dangers, asymmetric challenges, transnational dangers, and wild cards. WHITE HOUSE, A
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FORA NEW CENTURY 8-10 (1997) [hereinafrer NSS). For an
argument that future clashes are likely to be driven by culture rather than ideology or economics,
see Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash oj Civilizations?, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Summer 1993, at 22.
to. These trends are described generally in CFJO, supra note 7, at 9-to.
11. On leveraging the advantage in technology, see Anthony H. Cordesman, Compensating
jor Smaller Forces: Adjusting Ways and Means through Technology, U.S. Army War College Third
Annual Conference on Strategy Proceedings, Apr. 1992, at 1.
12. All of the likely adversaries of the United States in the Middle East are developing
chemical and/or biological warfure capabilities. DEPT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE
MIDDLE EAST 17-18 (1995). Each also supports, in one form or another, terrorism.
13. A war game held recendy at National Defense University illustrates the type ofwarfure
the future may hold. Set in the year 2000, the scenario posits an OPEC meeting that collapses
when Saudi Arabia opposes Iranian demands for a production cutback in order to drive prices
up. Afrer mobilizing its forces, Iran conducts several conventional atracks on Saudi naval vessels.
Hoping to destabilize the Saudi government and keep the U.S. and U.K. out of the conflict, the
Iranians conduct new generation unconventional warfure. For instance, a Saudi refinery is
destroyed when computer malfunctions in its control mechanism cause fire to break out, a "logic
bomb" placed in the computer system running trains in the U.S. causes a passenger train to crash
into a freight train, computer "worms" begin to corrupt the U.S. military's classified deployment
database, and a "sniffer" disrupts funds transfers in the Bank of England. Steve Lohr, Ready, Aim,
Zap, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1996, at D-1.
14. NSS, supra note 9, particularly at 2.
15. Admiral William A. Owens, The Emerging System ojSystems, PROCEEDINGS, May 1995,
at 36, 36. A threat based strategy is designed to counter specific threats, e.g., the Soviet threat
during the Cold War. By contrast, a capability based strategy is driven by particular capabilities,
e.g., global mobility, a force has. Of course, the strategy selected drives force structure
development. For a catalog of the capabilities seen as necessary by the U.S. military, see JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF, NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY 24-27(1997) [hereinafter NMS). A
comprehensive study of U.S. strategic strengths and weaknesses is NATIONAL DEFENSE
UNIVERSITY, STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT 1996 (1996). The Department of Defense completed a
major assessment of future force structure requirements, The Quadrennial Defense Review, in
1997. For the Secretary of Defense's overview of the Review, see WILLIAM S. COHEN, THE
REpORT OF THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW (May 1997). A longer-term assessment than
the QDR is NATIONAL DEFENSE PANEL, REpORT, TRANSFORMING DEFENSE: NATIONAL
SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Dec. 1997).
16. NMS, supra note 15, at 15. Today, the dual threat is generally viewed as conSisting of
North Korea and Iran or Iraq. It is recognized that these may not be the opponents of the future.
However, the underlying concept, being capability based, is that the United States needs to be
ready to respond to two major theater wars, whoever the opponents might be.
17. Id. at 16.
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18. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT VISION 2010 (1996) [hereinafter jV 2010]. joint
Vision 2010 is complemented by service-specific visions: U.S. NAW, FORWARD ... FROM THE
SEA (1994); U.S. ARMY, ARMY VISION 2010 (1996); U.S. AIR FORCE, GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT:
A VISION FOR TIiE 21ST CENTURY (1996).
19. jV 2010, supra note 18, at 20.
20. See CFJO, supra note 7, at 50.
21. JV 2010, supra note 18, at 21.
22. CFJO, supra note 7, at 51.
23. JV 2010, supra note 18, at 23.
24. Focused lOgistics, the fourth operational concept is the "fusion ofinformation, logistics,
and transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response, to track and shift assets even
while enroute, and to deliver tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels of operations." Id. at 24.
25. The National Military Strategy cites the following "strategic enablers:" (1) a high
quality force; (2) robust all-source intelligence; (3) global command and control; (4) air and sea
control; (5) space control; and (6) strategic mobility. NMS, supra note 15, at 27.
26. On the "revolution in military affairs," see Dennis M. Drew, Technology and the
American Way of War: Worshipping a False Idal? AIR FORCE J. LOGISTICS, Winter 1987, at 21;
James R. FitzSimonds, The Coming Military Revolution: Opportunities and Risks, PARAMETERS,
Summer 1995, at 30; Dan Goure, Is There a Military-Technical Revolution in America's Future?
WASH. QUARTERLY, Autumn 1993, at 175; Andrew F. Krepinevich, Cavalry to Computer: The
Pattern of Military Revolutions, in STRATEGY AND FORCE PLANNING 582 (Naval War College
Faculty eds., 1995); Andrew F. Krepinevich, Keeping Pace with the Military-Technical Revolution,
ISSUES IN SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, Summer 1994, at 23; Kenneth F. McKenzie, Beyond
Luddites and Magicians: Examining the MTR, PARAMETERS, Summer 1995, at 15; Abhi Shelat,
An Empty Revolution: MTR Expectations Fall Short, HARVARD INT'L REV., Summer 1994, at 52.
27. Colin Gray, e.g., cites seven "historical transformations of warfare" since the fall of
Rome: (1) fifth-century cavalry, which "ushered in a long period of advantage for soldiers who
could fight on horseback"; (2) the military revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
that "was led by the adoption of firearms for siege and open warfare"; (3) the "Nation in Arms, " a
"concept of popular warfare, increasingly armed and sustained by industrially and agriculturally
modem states"; (5) mechanized warfare, signaled in 1916 by use of the tank in the Battle of the
Somme and large-scale aerial battles over Verdun; (6) nuclear warfare; and (7) information age
warfare. ColinS. Gray, The Influence of Space Power upon History, 15 COMPARATIVE STRATEGY
293, 297 (1996). See also Eliot A. Cohen, A Revolution in Warfare, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
March-April 1996, at37.
28. For a comparison of the nuclear and information RMAs, see Martin C. Libicki,
Information & Nuclear RMAs Compared, NAT'L DEF. U. STRATEGIC FORUM, No. 82, July 1996,
available on-line at <http://198.80.36.91/ndu/inss/strforumlforum82.html>.
29. "Geneva Law" denotes that portion of the law of armed conflict addreSSing protected
persons: civilians, prisoners of war, the sick or shipwrecked, and medical personneL It is to be
distinguished from "Hague Law," which governs methods and means of combat, occupation, and
neutrality. For a discussion of the international instruments which fall into each category, and of
those which display elements of both, see FREDERIC DE MULlNEN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
WAR FOR Aru..iED FORCES 3-4 (1987).
30. E.g., Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, Aug. 5,1963,14 U.S.T. 1313,480 U.N.T.S. 43,2 LL.M. 889 (1963); Treaty for
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the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty ofTlatelolco), Feb. 14, 1967,634
U.N.T.S. 281, 6 LL.M.521 (1967); Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, 7 LL.M. 811 (1968); Treaty on the Prohibition of the
Emplacement ofNuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and
the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971,23 U.S.T. 701, 10 LLM. 146 (1971).
31. E.g., Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear
Weapons, G.A. Res. 1653 (XVI), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 17, at 4, U.N. Doc. N5100 (1961);
Resolution on the Non-Use of Force in International Relations and Permanent Prohibition of
the Use of Nuclear Weapons, G.A. Res. 2936, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 30, at 5, U.N. Doc.
N8730 (1972); Resolution on the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons and Prevention of Nuclear
War, G.A. Res. 35/152D, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 48, U.N. Doc. N35/48 (1980).
32. Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, July 8, 1996,35
I.L.M.809 (1996). On the case, see Michael N. Schmitt, The International Court ofJustice and the
Use of Nuclear Weapons, NAVAL WARCOLL. REv. Spring 1998, at 91.
33. CFJO, supra note 7, at 23-25. Some have cautioned about forgetting basic truisms of
war in the haste to embrace new technologies as a panacea to clear the fog of war. Mackubin
Owens of the Naval War College has noted that there is a
recredescence of a McNamara-like worship of technology in some parts of the Pentagon, a
worship that ignores the principal lesson of military history: as long as war involves
humans, no technology can completely eliminate friction, ambiguity and uncertainty,
thereby ensuring that a military organization will function at 100 percent efficiency..•.The
question is, who is more relevant to war in the real world: Clausewitz, who observed that
"everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate
and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced
war."; or those who reject him, explicidy or implicidy, assuming that technology will
render friction in war obsolete?
But technology is only part of the equation. Any approach to war that ignores strategy
and friction and tempts us to forget that war is waged against an adversary with an active
will, is doomed to failure.
Mackubin T. Owens, Planmng for Future Conflict: Strategy vs. "Fad," STRATEGIC REv., Summer
1996, at 5, 6.
34. See generally, DoMINANT BATTLESPACE AWARENESS (Stuart Johnson & Mattin
Libicki eds., 1995), available on-line at <http://198.80.36.91/ndu/inss/hooks/dbkJdbk1.htrnl>.
35. See generally ALVIN TOFFLER & HEIDI TOFFLER, WAR AND ANTI-WAR (1993) and
ALVIN TOFFLER & HEIDI TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE (1980). The Tomers posit three waves
of warfare driven by the age in which they took place: agricultural, industrial, and information.
Military objectives are in great part determined by the period during which they are pursued. For
instance, in the agricultural era, land was an objective, whereas in the industrial period,
industrial capacity was. The work of the Tomers is now de rigeur in U.S. war colleges, though not
all are convinced of its validity. For a piece criticizing the work as neo-Marxist and charging that
the Tomers had to "rearrange certain chronologies so the events develop in proper perspective,"
see R.L. DiNardo & Daniel J. Hughes, Some Cautionary Thoughts on Information WTarfare,
AIRPOWERJOURNAL, Winter 1995, at 70. For two fascinating discussions of the origin of war,
see BARBARA EHRENREICH, BLOOD RITES (1997) & ROBERT L. O'CONNELL, RIDE OF THE
SECOND HORSEMAN: THE BIRTH AND DEATH OF WAR (1995).
36. In anticipation of this reality, the U.S. Air Force, Army, and Navy have all established
information warfare centers, as has the Central Intelligence Agency, and doctrine on
information warfare has recendy been formally issued by the U.S. Joint Staff. Mark Walsh, U.S.
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Military Expands Information Warfare Defense, DEFENSE NEWS, April 28-May 4, 1997, at 25;
Lohr, supra note 13, at 04; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (C]CSI 3210.01), JOint
Information Warfare Policy (series, some documents classified). See also Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Information Warfare: Legal, Regulatory, Policy and Organizational Considerations for
Assurance (Research Report for the Chief, Information Warfare Division, J6K) Ouly 4, 1995).
37. This point is made by JosephNye and William Owens:
The core of these capabilities-dominant situational knowledge-is fungible and
divisible. The United States can share all or part of its knowledge with whomever it
chooses. Sharing would empower recipients to make better decisions in a less-than-benign
world, and should they decide to fight, they could achieve the same kind of military
dominance as the United States.
As its capacity to provide this kind of information increases, America will increasingly
be viewed as a coalition leader, not just because it happens to be the strongest but because
it can provide the most important input for good decisions and effective action for other
coalition members. Just as nuclear dominance was the key to coalition leadership in the
old era, information dominance will be the key in the information age
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., & William A. Owens, America's Information Edge, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
MarchlAprill996, at 20,27.
38. There are four categories of sensors: (1) Far stand-off sensors, such as satellites; (2) near
stand-off sensors, such as aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles carrying various sensors
(multispectral, passive microwave, electronic intelligence, etc.); (3) in-place sensors, such as
acoustic, gravimetric, biochemical, and ground-based optical; and (4) weapons sensors, such as
infrared, reflected radar, etc. MARTIN C. LIBICKI, WHAT Is INFORMATION WARFARE? 22
(1995).
39. Resolution is expected to reach ten meters, improvable to two-to-three meters with
signal-to-noise calculations. Periodic coverage in the submeter range will be made possible
through multispectral, hyperspectral, and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) images. Jeffrey E.
Thieret et aI., Hit 'Em Where It Hurts: Strategic Attack in 2025, in AIR UNIVERSITY, 2025, WHITE
PAPERS (vol. 3, bk. 1) 173,187 (1996).
40. Pat Cooper, U.S. Develops Army of Tiny Robots, DEF. NEWS, Nov. 11-17, 1996, at 4.
41. Smelling sensors would be designed to detect particular chemical molecules, which
would cause an organic change in the sensor detectable by irradiated light or X-ray energy.
Tasting sensors would atrach themselves to particular substances. They too could be irradiated.
In both cases, overhead sensors could be used to collect the data. Thieret, supra note 39, at
187-88.
42. For an excellent review of future sensors and sensor operations, see Space Cast 2020, The
Infosphere: Surveillance and Reconnaissance in 2020, AIRPOWERJOURNAL, Summer 1995, at 8.
43. Barbara A. Jezior, The Revolutionized Warfighter Circa 2025 (unpublished manuscript
on file at Naval War College Library, 1997); Art Pine, Revolutionary High-Tech Military Plan Isn't
Ready for the World's Battlefields, PROVIDENCE JOURNAL, Jan. 5, 1997, at D5. See also Infantry
System Turns Soldier into High-Tech Warrior, NATIONAL DEFENSE, Apr. 1997, at 24.
44. USAF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD, NE\VWORLD VISTAS: AIRANDSPACEPOWER
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (summary vol.) 11 (1995).
45. Douglas Waller, Onward Cyber Soldiers, TIME, Aug. 21, 1995, at 38, 41.
46. Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance. An outline of U.S. approaches to this subject is JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 0-6),
C4I FOR THE W ARRlOR: GLOBAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM-FROM CONCEPT TO
REALITY (1994).
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47. See JV 2010, supra note 18, at 15. What these developments will do to the fundamental
nature of military decision making has yet to be seen. Greater technology could lead to greater
restraints on the "shooter," a phenomenon exemplified in the past by excessive radar based
ground control over East Bloc pilots conducting aerial intercepts. The danger is that the closer
the senior commander is to being on the battlefield, the more he or she may want to control it.
CFJO, supra note 7, at 27, notes this danger. "Access to extensive information about the tactical
situation may tempt strategic and operational commanders to take control of tactical actions."
On the other hand, the individual shooter will have far more information available to make
informed decisions than has been the case thus far. For example, today fighters patrolling no-fly
zones depend on aircraft such as the AWACS to provide them a verbal picture of their combat
environment. In the twenty-first century, that information will be immediately available in the
cockpit. Such individual capabilities could have the effect of allOwing greater autonomy to those
who direcdy apply force.
48. NEW WORLD VISTAS, supra note 44, at 60; CFJO, supra note 7, at 25. Even today a
stealth Comanche helicopter and a T-3 unmanned, reconnaissance aerial vehicle (URAV) are
under development. To Dissolve, to Disappear, ECONOMIST, June 10, 1995, at 11.
49. NEW WORLD VISTAS, supra note 44, at 8.
50. DiNardo & Hughes, supra note 35, at 75.
51. See, e.g., James Blackwell, Prospects and Risks of Technological Dependency, U.S. Army
War College Third Annual Conference on Strategy Proceedings, Apr. 1992, at 29; Neil Munro,
Our Electronic Achilles' Heel: A Wonk A'l7Tled with a Computer Could Bring America to Its Knees,
WASH. POST NAT. WEEKLY ED., Aug. 14-20, 1996, at 24.
52. Thomas E. Ricks, Information-Warfare Defense is Urged, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Jan.
6,1997, at 1, B2.
53. The Operation Desert Storm Air Campaign Plan is described in DEPT OF DEFENSE.
CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR {Title V Report to Congress} 95-101 (1992). The
approach to current targeting philosophy has been set forth by Colonel John Warden as "Five
Strategic Rings." The concentric rings are political leadership, economic systems, supporting
infrastructure, population, and military forces. Attacking leadership targets (command and
control, communications, etc.) gready diminishes the difficulty of attacking military forces.
Leadership is seen as the primary center of gravity. See generally, John A. Warden III, The Enemy
as a System, AIRPOWERJOURNAL, Spring 1995, at 44.
54. For an argument that the "network force" must train to the possibility of disruptions in
the information system, see, Mark Tempestilli, The Network Force, PROCEEDINGS, June 1996, at
42,46.
55. Jeffrey McKitrick et a1., The Revolution in Military Affairs, in BATILEFIELD OF THE
FUTURE 65,78 (Barry R. Schneider & Lawrence E. Grinter eds .• 1995).
56. The most publicly visible change has been in weapons accuracy, a result of misleading
Gulf War news coverage of smart bomb (precision guided munitions-PGM) attacks. In fact,
they were prematurely acclaimed. Only roughly 8 percent of the weapons dropped during the
war were precision guided. A General Accounting Office study of attacks on twenty major
targets found that at least two laser guided weapons were used against each. At least six were
dropped on 20 percent of the targets and 15 percent of the targets were attacked by at least eight.
Tony Capaccio, GAO Questions U.S. Air Power Impact on Gulf War, DEFENSE WEEK, June 30,
1997, at 1. See also Barton Geldman, U.S. Bombs Missed 70% of the Time: "Smart" Munitions Far
More Accurate, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 1991, at A-I.
57. Thieret et a1., supra note 39, at 185-6.
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58. Technologies that will enable such analysis include hyperspectral and magnetic
resonance imaging. In the former, the electromagnetic spectrum is broken into its constituent
bands for hundreds of individual analyses. The data is then fused for a single readout. This
capability frustrates the possibility of a target avoiding detection in one spectrum (e.g., visual or
infrared). In magnetic resonance imaging, particles spread over a building by a UAV are sucked
into it through the ventilation system. Air- or space-borne sensors would then image the
particles to determine the building's internal structure. Id. at 187.
59. William Matthews, New Bombs Penetrate, Incinerate, AIR FORCE TIMES, Feb. 16, 1998,
at6.
60. NEW WORLD VISTAS, supra note 44, at 38.
61. Thieret et al., supra note 39, at 189. For instance, today hardened targets are best
attacked with at least a two-thousand-pound guided bomb unit. Programs are underway to
reduce that to 250 pounds, smaller than the average conventional bomb in today's arsenal.
62. From a ground perspective, consider the Army's BAT, the brilliant antiarmor
submunition that will be fired by the Army Tactical Missile System. The munitions will use
acoustic and infrared sensors to identify a formation of vehicles, single one out for attack, and
destroy it. Owens, supra note 15, at 37.
63. NEW WORLD VISTAS, supra note 44, at 9-10.
64. Department of Defense policy on the use of nonlethal weapons is set forth at DOD
Directive 3000.3, Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons Ouly 9,1996). See also James W. Cook III et
at, Non-lethal Weapons: Technologies, Legalities, and Potential Policies, AIRPOWER JOURNAL,
Special Edition 1995, at 77,78; James
Duncan, A Primer on the Employment of Non-Lethal
Weapons, 1998 NAVAL L Rev. (forthcoming).
65. Douglas Pasternak, Wonder Weapons, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REpORT, July 7, 1997,
at 38. Both acoustic and microwave weapons could be used for perimeter defense or crowd
control, and both, used to the extreme, are potentially lethal.
66. Greg R. Schneider, Nonlethal Weapons: Considerations for Decision Makers 27
(University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Arms Control, Disarmament, and International
Security Occasional Paper, Jan. 1997).
67. Id. at 14.
68. Id. at 20-2.
69. Jezoir, supra note 43, at 16; Schneider, supra note 66, at 27.
70. Schneider, supra note 66, at 9-10. Especially useful in urban warfare because of
dependency on roads, slick-ums could also be used to disrupt resupply, provide blockage in
maneuver warfare, or temporarily disable runways.
71. On the threat posed byinformation warfare, see OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION & TECHNOLOGY, REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BoARD
TASK FORCE ON INFORMATION WARFARE DEFENSE, Nov. 1996, esp. app. B (Threat
Assessment) .
72. Space systems used during the war are described in CONDUer OF THE PERSIAN GULF
WAR, supra note 53, at 801-806.
73. On this point, see Gray, supra note 27, at 307.
74. SPACE COMMAND VISION, supra note 7, at n.p.
75. Id. at n.p. The Air Force's Scientific Advisory Board concurs: "Capabilities to defend
our own space based resources and to disrupt and degrade that of an enemy will be needed sooner
or later in the 21st century." NEW WORLD VISTAS, supra note 44, at 61.
76. NE\V WORLD VISTAS, supra note 44, at 47. The Board has further noted that "[t)he
future Force will, eventually, contain space, ground, and airborne weapons that can project

c.

421

Bellum Americanum
photon energy, kinetic energy, and information against space and ground assets. Many space and
information weapons will destroy. Others will confuse the enemy and weave the 'bodyguard of
lies' that will protect our forces." rd. at 11.
77. Owens, supra note 15, at 38.
78. Global Partnership is one of Space Command's four operational concepts. SPACE
COMMAND VISION, supra note 7, at n.p. This adds another dimension to the
complexity-nationality. For example, consider neutrality. What if a belligerent is receiving
dual-use data (e.g., weather) from a satellite owned by a neutral or a multinational corporation
with neutral partners? Can it be attacked? Can the U.S. use data received from a satellite that it
shares with a neutral? Such complexity will only be exacerbated in the next century as space
commercialization explodes.
79. For superb summaries of the current law of armed conflict, see LESLIE C. GREEN, THE
CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (1993) and THE HANDBOOK OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995). The latter work
reproduces the German Law of War Manual Uoint Services regulations (Zdv) 1512, Aug. 1992)
and provides extended commentary thereon by international law experts.
80. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4): UAll Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
81. It would appear that the drafters of the Charter did not intend the term Uforce" to apply
beyond armed force. Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 106, 112 (Bruno Simma ed., 1994).
82. Under Article 39 of Chapter VII, the Security Council determines whether a "threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" exists. When the Council finds one does, it
may "call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems
necessary or desirable. " rd., art. 40. It may also direcdy impose "measures not involving the use of
armed force," such as interrupting aerial "means of communication." rd., art. 41. When the
Security Council determines that non-forceful measures would be or have proved inadequate, it
may authorize the United Nations, regional organizations, or member States to use force under
Article 42 to restore or maintain peace. Force includes "such action by air, sea, or land forces as
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security ... [including) ...
demonstrations, blockades, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the
United Nations." rd., art. 42. For a discussion of the terms "threat, breach, and aggression," see
Jochen Frowein, Article 39, in Simma, supra note 81, 60S, 608-12.
83. U.N. CHARTER art. 51:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed atrack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be
immediatelyreported to the Security Council and shall not in anyway affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such
action as it deems necessary in order tomaintain or restore international peace and security.
For a discussion of "armed attack," see Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in Simma, supra note
81, at 661,668-51. Numerous international agreements and pronouncements have reaffirmed
this right of self-defense since ratification of the U.N. Charter. See, e.g., Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, art. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77 (Rio Treaty);
Declaration on Principles ofInternational Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV),
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princ. I, U.N. Doc. N8028 (1971),9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970); North Adantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949,
art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243; Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual
Assistance, Oct. 10, 1955, art. 4, 219 U.N.T.S. 3 (\'Varsaw Pact Treaty).
84. Anticipatory self-defense is self-defense which occurs immediately prior to the attack.
The most widely accepted standard is that articulated by U.S. Secretary ofState Daniel Webster
with regard to the Caroline incident. The Caroline incident involved a Canadian insurrection in
1837. After being defeated, the insurgents retreated into the United States, where theyrecruited
more insurgents and planned further operations. The Caroline was being used by the rebels.
British troops crossed the border and destroyed the vessel by setting her afire and sending her
over Niagara Falls. Britain justified the action on the grounds that the United States was not
enforCing its laws along the frontier and that the action was a legitimate exercise of self-defense.
\Vebster replied that self-defense was to "be confined to cases in which the necessity of that
self-defense is instant, ovenvhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation." Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 6, 1842), reprinted in JOHN
BASSE1T MOORE, 2 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 411, 412. Professor Yoram Dinstein
adopts the terminology "interceptive" self-defense. It occurs after the other side has "committed
itself to an armed attack in an ostensibly irrevocable way." He argues that interceptive
self-defense is consistent with Article 51. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF
DEFENCE 190 (2d ed. 1994).
85. On economic sanctions, see Paul S. Szasz, The Law ofEconomic Sanctions, in this volume.
86. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 103: "There appears
now to be general agreement on the nature of the acts which can be treated as constituting an
armed attack. In particular, it may be considered to be agreed that an armed attack must be
understood as including not merely action by regular armed forces across an international border,
but also 'the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars, or mercenaries,
which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as it amounts to' (inter
alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, or its substantial involvement therein."
87. On this point, see generally Donald A. Daniel, The Evolution of Naval Power to the Year
20ID, NAVAL WARCOLL. REv., Summer 1995, at 62.
88. In order to act in self-defense, U.S. forces must face either a hostile act or a
demonstration of hostile intent by an opponent. Hostile intent is defined as
the threat ofimminent use offorce by a foreign force or terrorist unit, or organization against
the United States and US national interests, US forces, and in certain circumstances, US
citizens, their property, US commercial assets, or other designated non-US forces, foreign
nationals and their property. When hostile intent is present, the right exists to use
proportional force, including armed force, in self-defense by all necessary means available to
deter or neutralize the potential attacker or, if necessary, to destroy the threat. A
determination that hostile intent exists and requires the use of proportional force in
self-defense must be based on convincing evidence that an attack is imminent.
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (ClCSI) 3121.02, Standing Rules of Engagement for
United States Forces (1994), at GL-9. This is a classified document, but large portions, including
this quote, are unclassified.
89. "Instant and ovenvhelrning" is the Caroline standard. See supra note 84.
90. Actually, the Administration's statements seemed to include justifications based on
both anticipatory self-defense and retaliation. For example, in the President's national address
on the subject, he initially appeared to use reprisal as the basis for the attack: "Several weeks ago
in New Orleans, I warned Colonel Qadhafi we would hold his regime accountable for any new
terrorist attacks launched against American citizens. More recendy, I made it clear we would
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respond as soon as we determined conclusively who was responsible." He then offered a classic
self-defense justification: "Self-defense is not only our right, it is our duty. It is the purpose
behind the mission undertaken tonight-a mission fully consistent with Article 51 of the UN
Charter." President Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation (Apr. 14, 1986), in DEP'T ST. BULL.,
June 1986, at 1-2. See also White House Statement, DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1986, at 1. Much
attention has been paid to the fact that the United States believed Libya was planning attacks on
up to thirty U.S. diplomatic facilities worldwide. loint News Conference by George Schultz,
Secretary of State, and Casper Weinberger, Secretary of Defense (Apr. 14, 1986), in DEP'T ST. BULL.,
June 1986, at 3.
91. The distinction between international and non-international armed conflict is not
always clear. Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions, an agreement designed to
govern the latter, describes non-international armed conflict as "armed conflicts ... which take
place in the territory of a [patty to the Convention) between its armed forces and dissident
armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such
conttol over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military
operations." Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 1 (1), U.N.
Doc. N32/144, Annex II (1977), 16 LL.M. 1442 (1977), [hereinafter Protocol II). International
armed conflict is that which arises between States (or other subjects of international law) . See,
e.g., Common Article 2 to the Geneva Conventions: "The present Convention shall apply to all
cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the
High Conttacting Parries, even if a state of war is not recognized by one of them." Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention
I); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II); Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N. T.S. 135
[hereinafter Geneva Convention III); and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention IV]. Additional Protocol I, which supplements the Geneva Conventions
with regard to international armed conflict, simply refers back to Common Article 2. Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, art. 1 (3), U.N. Doc. N321144, Annex I
(1977), reprinted in 16 LL.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I]. In a somewhat controversial
provision, Protocol I includes as international armed conflicts "armed conflicts in which peoples
are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and racist regimes in the exercise
of their right of self-determination." Id., art. 1 (4). Note that "internal disturbances and tensions,
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature" are not
armed conflict, either international or non-international. Protocol II, supra, art. 1 (2).
92. Article 3 of each of the Geneva Conventions is identical and provides basic protections
for "persons taking no part in the hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have
laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any
other cause." Geneva Conventions I, II, III, IV, supra note 91, art. 3. The remainder of those
conventions address international armed conflicts.
93. Compare Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdomovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Appeals Chamber
Judgment, Oct. 7, 1997 (finding an international conflict vis-a.-vis the Bosnian Croats) with
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-t-T, Opinion and Judgment, May 7, 1997. For a
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discussion of these cases, see Leslie C. Green, Erdemovic-Tadic-Dokmanovic: Jurisdiction and
Early Practice of the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal (unpublished manuscript on file with
author, forthcoming in LESLIE C. GREEN, FURTHER EsSAYS ON THE MODERN LAw OF WAR
(Transnational Pub., 1998».
94. See William J. Fenrick, The Development of the Law of Anned Conflict through the
Jurisprudence of the Intemati07UII Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in this volume.
95. Protocol I, supra note 91, art. 48: "In order to ensure respect for and protection of the
civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish
between the civilian population and combatants and civilian objects and military objectives and
shall direct their operations only against military objectives."
96. Protocol I, supra note 91, art. 48.
97. Id., art. 52(2). The term "object" includes combatants within its scope. COMMENTARY
ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12
AUGUST 1949, at 635 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987)
[hereinafter COMMENTARY). Military advantage should be evaluated in terms of the entire
campaign/war, not simply the advantage which accrues directly to the attacking force. On this
point, see Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in Fleck, supra note 79, at 105.
98. COMMENTARY, supra note 97, at 635-36.
99. Protocol I, supra note 91, art. 51(2).
100. Id., art. 51 (3).
101. COMMENTARY, supra note 97, at 619.
102. Protocol I, supra note 91, art. 50(1-2).
103. For an argument directly opposing the ICRC's restrictive approach, see W. Hays Parks,
Air \Var and the Law of War, 32 AIR FORCE L. REv. 1, 113-145 (1992).
104. For a general unofficial compilation of the u.S. views on Protocol I by then State
Department attorneys, see Abraham D. Sofaer, AGORA: The U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I
to the Geneva Conventions on the Protection ofWar Victims, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 784 (1988); Michael
J. Matheson, Session One: The United States Position on the Relation of Customary Internati07UI1 Law
to the 1977 Protocols Additi07UI1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. u. J. INT'L L.& POL'Y 419
(1987).
105. Letter from DAJA-IA to Counselor for Defense Research and Engineering
(Economics), Embassy of the Federal RepUblic of Germany Oan. 22,1988), cited in Parks, supra
note 103, at 134.
106. U.S. NAVY/MARINE CORPS/COAST GUARD, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (NWP I-14M, MCWP 5-2.1, COMDTPUB P5800.7),
para. 8.1.1 (1995). The manual labels this a "statement of customary law," citing General
Counsel, Dep't of Defense, letter of Sept. 22, 1972, reprinted in 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 123-24 (1973).
The annotated version ofNWP I-14M specifically defers on the more conttoversial issue of
"whether this rule permits attacks on war-sustaining cargo carried in neutral bottoms at sea, such
as by Iraq on Iranian tankers carrying oil exported by Iran during the Iran-Iraq war." NWP
I-14M, supra, Annotated Version (1997), at 8-3 n.1l.
107. Parties to Protocol I are obligated to "endeavour to remove the civilian population,
individual civilians and civilian objects under their conttol from the vicinity of military
objectives." Protocol I, supra note 91, art. 58(a). However, even if a Party intentionally uses
civilians as a shield, the attacker remains obligated to consider collateral damage and incidental
injuries in their discrimination and proportionality calculations. Id., art. 51(7--8).
108. The requirements for precautions are set forth in Protocol I, supra note 91, art. 57.
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109. After attacking Kuwait, the Iraqis used Western and Kuwaiti hostages to shield their
military sites from coalition air attacks. The non-Kuwaiti civilians were eventually released in
December 1990 when the tactic resulted in near universal condemnation. CONDUCT OF THE
PERSIAN GuLF WAR, supra note 53, at 607
Using a civilian or other protected person in such
a manner is a violation of Geneva Convention N and Protocol I and constitutes a Grave Breach.
Geneva Convention N, supra note 91, artS. 29 & 149; Protocol I, supra note 91, arts. 75(2) (c) &
85(2). Other examples included the dispersal of helicopters to residential areas, placing
surface-to-air missiles in a school in a populated area of Kuwait City, and placement of fighter
aircraft next to the Temple ofUr. CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR, supra, at 613-15.
11 O. Even if a Party intentionally uses civilians as a shield, a specific violation of Protocol I,
the attacking party remains obligated to consider collateral damage and incidental injuries in
their discrimination and proportionality calculations. Protocol I, supra note 91, art. 51 (7-8).
111. Perfidy consists of "acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe
that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the tules of international law
applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence." Protocol I, supra note 91,
art. 37. In addition to Protocol I, perfidy is forbidden in the Hague N Annexed Regulations.
Hague Convention N Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with Annexed
Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 23 (F), 36 Stat. 2227, 1 Bevans 631.
112. Hague Convention N, supra note 111, art. 1.
113. Geneva Convention N, supra note 91, art. 4A(2).
114. The requirement that combatants distinguish themselves from non-combatants
through use ofa distinctive emblem dates back to the Brussels Declaration of 1874. Project on an
International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War, reprinted in Schindler &
Toman, supra note 2, at 25. \Vith regard to Protocol I, according to the Rapporteur, the
"exception recognized that situations could occur in occupied territory and in wars of national
liberation in which a guerrilla fighter could not distinguish himself throughout his military
operations and still retain any chance of success." XV Official Records of the Diplomatic
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law
Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 1974-1974, at 453, CDDHJ407/Rev.1, para. 19.
115. Protocol I, supra note 91, art. 44(3). The United States opposes this provision on the
ground that it will place civilians at greater risk by making it harder for military personnel to
distinguish them from lawful combatants. 1 U.S. AIR FORCE, OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL, OPERATIONS LAW DEPLOYMENTDESKBOOK (n.d.), tab 12, para. 1.7.6.1. Thus, by
the U.S. view, those who fail to comply with the reqUirements of Hague become illegal
combatants who can be targeted and, if determined to be illegal combatants by an appropriate
Tribunal, tried and punished. NWP I-14M, supra note 106, para. 12.7.1 (1995).
116. Protocol I, supra note 91, art. 51 (5) (b) defines it as "an attack which may be expected to
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated." A similar prohibition is found in the Article 57 requirements for precautions in
attack. Id., art. 57 (2) (a) (iii) & 57 (2) (b). On proportionality generally, see WilliamJ. Fenrick, The
Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional War/are, 98 MIL. L. REv. 91 (1982); Judith G.
Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM.]. IN1"L L. 391 (1993).
117. The targeting policy of the Coalition forces during the Persian Gulf War was clearly
moving in this direction. For instance, only PGMs were used against targets in downtown
Baghdad, to avoid collateral damage and incidental injury. CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF
WAR, supra note 53, at 97-98.
118. Described in id. at 615.
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119. For a description of current aerial weaponry and their employment techniques, see
Robert A. Coe & Michael N. Schmitt, Fighter Ops for Shoe Clerks, 42 AIR FORCE 1. REV. 49
(1997).
120. Protocol I, supra note 91, arts. 51(5) (b), 57(2) (b).
121. For instance, Article 57 requires "those who plan or decide upon an attack" to "do
everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian
objects and are not subject to special protection" and to "take all feasible precautions in the
choices of means and methods of attack (emphasis added)." Protocol I, supra note 91, art.
57 (2) (i-H). The ICRC Commentary imposes a fairly demanding standard:
[T)he identification of the objective, particularly when it is located at a great distance,
should be carried out with great care. Admittedly, those who plan or decide upon such an
attack will base their decision on information given them, and they cannot be expected to
have personal knowledge of the objective to be attacked and ofits exact nature. However,
this does not detract from their responsibility, and in case of doubt, even if there is only a
slight doubt, they must call for additional information and ifneed be give orders for further
reconnaissance....The evaluation of the information obtained must include a serious
check ofits accuracy [emphasis added).
COMMENTARY, supra note 97, at 680-81.
122. For an a'{cellent discussion of attacks on electrical grids, see James \Y!. Crawford, The
law of Noncombatant Immunity and the Targeting of National Electrical Power Systems, FLETCHER
FORUM OF WORLD AFF., Summer/Fall1997, at 101. For criticism of the air campaign's effect on
the civilian population, see Roger Normand & Chris afJochnick, The Legitimation of Violence: A
Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, 35 HARVARD J. INT'L 1. 387, 399-402 (1994); William M.
Arkin, The Environmental Threat of Military Operations, in PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT
IN ARMED CONFLICT 116 (Richard J. Grunawalt et al. eds, 1996).
123. Paradoxically, reverberating effects may enhance the deterrent or compellant effect of
an action, for the greater the impact, the more likely a target State's decision-making will be
affected.
124. On the subject of necessity generally, see H. McCoubrey, The Nature of the Modern
Doctrine of Military Necessity, 30 REVUE DE DROIT MILITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE LA GUERRE 216
(1991); DE MULINEN, supra note 29, at 82--84.
125. Hostages (U.S. v. List), 11 T.W.C. 759, 1248-54 (1950).
126. For an argument that the Coalition violated the principle of necessity, see Normand &
afJochnick, supra note 122, at 402-409.
127. Declaration ofSt. Petersburg, 1868, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 2, at
101. The principle is also expressed in Protocol I: "Itis prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles
and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering." Protocol I, supra note 91, art. 35(2).
128. This phrase is drawn from the Martens Clause. Found in Hague N, it provides:
Until a more complete code of laws has been issued, the high Contracting Parties deem it
expedient to declare that, in cases:not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the
inhabitants and belligerents remain under the protection and the,rule of principles of the
laws of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from
the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of public conscience.
Hague IV, supra note Ill, pmbl. A similar provision is found in Protocol I, supra note 91, art. 1 (2).
129. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, U.N. Doc.
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993).
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130. Biological \Veapons Convention, supra note 1.
131. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious Or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,
Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 7, reprinted in 191.L.M. 1523 (1980).
132. Geneva Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Cenain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed Excessively Injurious Or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects, Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines,
Booby-Traps and Other Devices (protocol II), 19 I.L.M. 1529 (1980), as amended on May 3,
1996,35 I.L.M. 1209 (1996). In 1997 antipersonnel mines were banned completely (for Parties)
in the Ottawa Treaty on Personnel Mines. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sept.
18, 1997, available online at ICRC website, supra note 3. The Convention is not yet in force.
133. Protocol N, supra note 1. Extensive discussion of the laser and mines issues can be
found at the ICRC's homepage website. <http://www.icrc.org!unicc!icrcnews.nsfJDoclndex/
home_ eng?OpenDocument>.
134. Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 1, art. 1.
135. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 129, an. 2.
136. On military activities in space, see Peter Jankowitsch, Legal Aspects of Military Space
Activities, in SPACE LAW: DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE 143 (NandasiriJasentuliyana ed., 1992);
Richard A. Morgan, Military Use of Commercial Communications Satellites: A New Look at the
Outer Space Treaty and "Peaceful Purposes," 60 J. AIRL. & COM. 237 (1994); Colleen Sullivan,
The Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space: An Emerging Principle of International Law, 4 TEMP.
INT'L & COMPo L.J. 211 (1990).
13 7. Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploitation and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan, 27, 1967, am. I & III, 18
U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, reprinted in 61.L.M. 386 (1967).
138. This was the position taken by Judge Benjamin Cardozo in Techt v. Hughes:
"international law to-day does not preserve treaties or annul them, regardless of the effects
produced. It deals with such problems pragmatically, preserving or annulling as the necessities of
war exact. It establishes standards, but it does not fetter itself with rules." 128 N.E. 185, 191
(N.Y.), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 643 (1920).
139. For a brief discussion of the approaches, see Michael N. Schmitt, Green War: An
Assessment of the Environmental Law ofInternational Armed Conflict, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1997).
140. NWP 1-14 Annotated, supra note 106, at 2-38, n.I14.
141. The requirementto train military personnel in the law of armed conflict is found in many
instruments. See, e.g., Hague N, supra note 111, art. 1; Geneva Convention I, supra note 91, art.
47; Geneva Convention II, supra note 91, art. 48; Geneva Convention III, supra note 91, art. 127;
Geneva convention N, supra note 91, art. 144; Protocol I, supra note 91, am. 83 & 87; Protocol II,
supra note 91, art. 19; Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note 131, art. 6. On the role of
legal advisers, see LESLIE C. GREEN, ESSAYS ON THE MODERN LAw OF WAR, ch. 4 (1985).
142. Since the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. military has invested heavily in smart weapons.
For example, the two U.S. carriers deployed to the Persian Gulf during the February 1998 crisis
carried with them more sman weapons than all six of the carriers deployed during the war.
Bradley Graham, New Weapons Give Navy Top Air Role This Time, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1998,
at 1, 25.
143. U.S. policy on this issue is described in White House Fact Sheet, U.S. Efforts to Address
the Problem of Anti-Personnel Landmines, Sept. 17, 1997, available online at
<htrp:!!www.state.gov!www!global/arms!index.htrnl>.
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